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North-South Trade, Property Rights, and the
Dynamics of the Environment
Graciela Chichilnisky
1. ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES AS A NORTH-SOUTH ISSUE
The global environment can be described by the physical dynamics and the economic
use of the earth's resources . It has become, to a certain extent, a North-South issue . )
Developing countries tend to specialize in the production and the export of goods
which deplete environmental resources such as rain forests, or resources such as
petroleum and coal whose combustion leads to the emission of greenhouse gases .
Currently two-thirds of the exports from Latin America are resources, and resources
make an even higher proportion of Africa's exports . Most of these resources are
imported and consumed by the industrial countries . For example, most of the
world's production of wood pulp is consumed in the industrial countries, as is the
petroleum exported by developing countries . The result is that industrial countries
account for a large majority of CO, emissions . The U.S . alone consumes 25-30% of
the world's oil production yearly . Because resources are traded intensively between
the North and the South, when trying to define precisely the concept of sustainable
development we are led therefore to question the role of international trade . 2
Wide debate focuses on acid rain, global warming and the preservation of rainforests . One hundred
nations agreed to consider a treaty to reduce the threat of global warming at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil . June
1992 . In Vancouver, February 1991 a pact was adopted that establishes a framework for a treaty linking
environmental policy to economic issues of interest to industrial and developing countries, such as the
remission of international sovereign debt and transfer of technology.
ZW. Baumol and W . Oates (1975), I . Walter (1975) . W . Oates (1991)1 . A . Tobey (1990) and others have
studied the effects that environmental control measures could have on patterns of international trade .
Some of these studies have found measurable effects (d'Arge and Kneese (1971)) . All these studies focus
on the policy aspects of measures to control pollution rather than on our issue : how differences in property
rights regimes can explain trade between countries in free markets, and the patterns of environmental use .
The general concern that developing countries develop an advantage in pollution-intensive industries .
known as the "pollution heaven hypothesis" has been studied by 1 . Walter and 1 . Ugelow (1979) . The
potential implication of policy measures to protect the environment on international trade was also studied
by Krutilla (1976), Maler (1976, 1990a), Chichilnisky (1982 . 1985, 1988b) . On the other hand . Dasgupta
(1990) points out that the literature on development economics and the environment is largely
undeveloped . The international trade literature has not taken up the issue of property rights differentials
affecting the pattern of trade, nor considered trade patterns in a general equilibrium model with common
property inputs . To the extend that externalities have been studied in international trade, they refer to
production externalities in a partial equilibrium framework, see, for example, Dixit and Norman (1980)
within Hechscker-Ohlin models where endowments are fixed . Instead, we study a general equilibrium
model with variable endowments of a common property resource which is an input to production, having
supplies which depend on property rights .
The Environment after Rio : International I-am , and Economics (L . Campigho, et al ., eds . : I -85333-949-0 :
(D Graham & Trotman : pub. Graham & Trotman, 1994 ; printed in Great Britain), pp . 205-233 .
ins
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these conditions trade can lead to private gains but to social losses . We define here
the concepts of private and public comparative advantage and of private and public
gains from trade . The weaker are the property rights the larger is the difference
between private and public comparative advantage and between private and public
gains from trade. Private gains from trade in environmentally intensive goods may
be acompanied by public losses from trade, and private comparative advantage may
be accompanied by public comparative disadvantages. This leads us to question the
extent to which traditional comparative advantages in the developing countries are a
good foundation for North-South trade.
It seems worth noting that environmental overuse in the South does not occur
solely because the locals over consume their resources, but because they export
these resources to a rich international market at prices which are below social costs.
This is why the global environmental issue is inextricably connected with North-
South trade. The South overproduces, but mostly because the North over consumes .
The international market transmits and enlarges the externalities of the global
commons. No policy which ignores this connection can work .
Possible policy implications are discussed: they involve improving property
rights of the local users of the common resource . Examples of innovative inter-
national property rights arrangements between U.S . industry and the localities near
rain forests in Central and South America are discussed. In addition, it seems indi-
cated to reconsider trade policies based on traditional comparative advantages in the
South. These policies promote the export of environmentally intensive goods, such
as wood products or cash crops. The World Bank has been for many years, and still
is, a strong promoter for such policies . One ought to take into account the possible
social losses in the South from following such policies, as well as the losses to the
North. The overuse of resources in the South is tranmitted and enlarged by the inter-
national market and becomes a problem for the world economy. Under these con-
ditions. either property rights in the South must be brought up to the level of the
North's, or else trade policies based on traditional comparative advantages ought to
be de-emphasized as much as possible . The production of agricultural products for
the domestic market could be reasonably carried out in the South, but products
based on agriculture seem a poor choice for their exports. Such products could be
exported instead bv the North, which has a comparative advantage in terms of agri-
cultural productivity . The same holds for other environmentally intensive products .
This could of course mean an increase in the market price of such products, but if so
this would induce more efficient use of the world's resources, and as such it should
be welcome.
In any case, the prices of environmentally intensive goods may not necessarily
increase if these are exported by the North. Market prices reflect input prices as
much as they reflect the productivity of these inputs . Expensive but productive
inputs could lead to lower prices : indeed this is the experience of agricultural pro-
duction in the industrial countries. The South could emphasize, instead, skilled-
labour intensive products, such as consumer electronics or telecommunications and
other manufactured products, following the example of the new industrialized
nations in Asia .
The theory of trade based on differential property rights presented here initiated
in Chichilnisky (1991), based on the North-South model introduced in Chichilnisky
(198 I . 1986) . The model and the results in this paper differ however from the pre-
vious work in that the dynamics of the renewable resource is crucial to our argu-
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ments, while all the other pieces consider instead static economies. The distinctive
feature of this paper is that we consider the dynamics of the renewable resource
which is used as an input to production, and how this varies with different property
rights regimes.
The chapter is organized as follows . Lemma 1 studies the connection between
property rights regimes and the long run stock of the renewable resource as a func-
tion of prices . On the basis of this result, Theorem I establishes the patterns of trade
implied by the difference in property rights in the two regions. It shows that differ-
ent property rights alone explain international trade between countries, even when
the countries are otherwise identical (same technologies, preferences and endow-
ments) . Corollary 1 explores the welfare implication of changes in property rights .
Lemma 1, Theorem I and Corollary I apply to unregulated and competirive mar-
kets . Section 6 discusses property rights policies . Section 7 is a conclusion which
summarizes the results. The Appendix formalizes the model of North-South trade
with variable property rights for an environmental resource which is used as an
input to production, and it proves the uniqueness of a market equilibrium.
The results provide a foundation for the desirability of improving property rights
regimes, and, in this sense, support Coase's (1960) propositions within the context
of international markets.4 However. as pointed out in Chichilnisky (1991), in our
case the pattern of ownership of property rights matters . Not only should property
rights be well defined, but the owners of these rights should have appropriate econ-
omic characteristics and incentives, a point which Dasgupta and Heal (1979) also
make within a different context.
2 . GAINS FROM TRADE : PRIVATE VS. SOCIAL DIMENSIONS
Environmental issues are generally connected with externalities in production and
consumption. Externalities have many forts. They occur for example when the out-
put of traded goods by one firm affects the production by others . Here 1 shall
address, instead, a class of environmental issues arising from the use of environ-
mental common property resources as inputs of production . I shall concentrate on
studying the behaviour of free markets in which the property rights for the common
property resources vary across regions. Of particular interest is how property rights
determine the patterns of trade in a free market (general) equilibrium, as well as the
pattern of environmental use across the trading regions.
Consider, for example, a tropical forest which is a common property resource
used as an input to production of timber, palm oil, fish, trapping, fishing, and phar-
maceutical products based on its biodiversity. The fact that environmental resources
are common property resources leads inevitably to a divergence between private and
social costs (Dasgupta, 1990 ; Dasgupta and Heal, 1979 . Many of these are renew-
able resources. They can be "produced" at a cost, up to a point, and used as crucial
inputs to production . "Overgrazing, over fishing, the depletion of trees and shrubs
from common land for use as fuel are familiar problems . They are traceable to the
'Cohen and Weitzman ( 1975) analyze a one-input model of an economy in which changes in property
rights affect the general equilibrium, via changes in the supply conditions of a common properly
resource, land .
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A, is the numeraire, i.e . PA = 1 . Since endowments, technologies and preferences are
defined, all ingredients of a general equilibrium model have been provided .
Demand is formalized as usual. For each vector of prices9 p = (PE, r, p B )
utility U(A, B) is maximized subject to a budget constraint : the value of consump-
tion of A and B cannot exceed the value of initial endowments. Under appropriate
(strict) concavity assumptions, this yields an aggregate demand vector for commod
ities denoted ( D A , D B ) , and a demand vector for inputs denoted ( D K , D E ),
for each price vector p. Formally :
(1) (DA, DB, DK, DE) = D (PB , r , PE)
Supply is formalized as follows. At each price vector p = (PE, r, PB) a quantity of
inputs is supplied according to the supply functions p E = p E (E ) and r = r ( K ) .
We shall assume that E is produced in the South from an input x which represents
for example labour in the subsistence sector of the economy.
The producers of goods A and B use these inputs efficiently, and so that all
available capital and environmental resources are employed . This determines the
quantity of A and B produced,' 0 denoted ( S A , S B ) = S ( p E , r, p B ) .
The excess demandfunction of the economy is therefore (D ( p B , r, p E ) _
D ( p B , r, p E ) - S ( p B , r, p E ) . Because the budget constraint is satisfied, at
all prices Walras Law is too: the value of excess demand equals zero :
(2) (DA - f(K, E)) + PB(DB -g(K, E)) + r.(DK - K(r)) + PE .(DE - E(PE)) = 0
A one region equilibrium is a price vector` p* at which each of the four markets
clears) 1 i.e . p * = q) - ' ( 0 ) ( o r p * TE ( (D - ' (0) ( . This is a standard defini-
tion of a market equilibrium in a competitive market economy.
The two-region model (North-South) general equilibrium model is constructed
as usual by considering two one-region models together, and relaxing the hypothesis
that each commodity market (for goods A and B) clears in each region, so as to
allow international trade. Input markets clear in each country because factors (K and
E) are immobile, i.e . not traded internationally. For the same reason, in a world
equilibrium the prices of these inputs may in principle be different in the two
countries. 12
The two regions are assumed to be identical in most respects : same technologies,
same inputs and produced goods, same utilities and the same supply function for
capital . The only difference between the regions is in the property rights which will
')In an equilibrium the prices of the inputs, PE and r, are related to those of the outputs, PB .
1aThis gives the quantities of goods A and B produced by profit maximizing producers, when both
factor markets clear_ Note that as is standard in constant returns economies there may be no well defined
partial equilibrium supply function for each producer without the additional assumption of full
employment of factors .
''Because Walras' Law is satisfied, it suffices that all but one markets clear, with non-zero prices, the
last market will clear automatically_
1 'Effectively the factor markets in each country are different markets under this assumption, and
achieve different prices in an equilibrium . This is a standard specification . Under certain conditions,
discussed in the last section, factor prices will equalize across the two regions even though the factors,
K ind F are not tr-ieri
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lead in turn to different supply functions 13 for the environmental common property
resource E, to which we now turn .
We shall consider two types of supply curves for the environmental common
property resource : one is the private supply curve, derived from the private marginal
cost curve of using or extracting the resource, the other the social supply curve
derived from the social marginal costs of use or extraction, and which takes account
of the negative externalities that one user has on others . This is formalized in the fol-
lowing section, where we show that at each market price the private 14 supply curve
E 't ( pE) provides more E than the social supply curve E 6 ( p E ) . In the model we
shall consider one supply curve for the North, its social supply curve, and two for
the South, both the social and the private supply curves . This is because we assume
that property rights for environmental common resources in the North are suffi-
ciently good that most social costs are internalized . The North's social and private
curves are therefore very close, and we assume they are equal. On the other hand,
we shall argue that in the South such property rights are not well defined, so that the
private and social curves are quite different. This derives from the lack of property
rights in the South, and is substantiated in the next section. Using the two different
curves in the South, private and social, leads to different concepts of comparative
advantages and of gains from trade.
A new concept of comparative advantage must now be defined. Neither the
Ricardian nor Heckscher-Ohlin concepts can be utilized here : since technologies
are the same, Ricardian comparative advantage does not exist in our model, and
since the endowments of factors vary with their prices, the Heckscher-Ohlin con-
cept of comparative advantage is not well defined here . We adopt the following defi-
nition : Region S is said to have a comparative advantage in the production of good
B, which is intensive in the use of the input E, when for each price PE the supply of
E relative to that of K in region S is larger than the corresponding relative supply in
region N at the same price . Obviously this definition requires that we specify which
supply curve is used : we shall differentiate between public and private comparative
advantages as follows. Private comparative advantage in region S is defined by
using the private supply curve for E in the South; public comparative advantage is
defined by using the social supply curve for E. As we shall prove in the following
section, when property rights are less developed in the South, the South will exhibit
a private comparative advantage in the production of B, even though it has no public
comparative advantage.
Different supply curves will also give rise to different production possibility sets .
Consider at each price vector p the quantity of E supplied according to the private
supply curve E = E"(PE), and the corresponding quantity of K = K(r) . With these two
quantities of E and K we may compute the set of all possible combinations of out-
puts A and B which are feasible using the production functions f and g. This set is
denoted PP"(p) . Taking the union for all p, we obtain the private production poss-
ibility set P P S n = up P P"(p ) , which we assume to be convex . Performing the
same procedure, but using the social supply curve E = En (PE), yields the public
production possibility set P P S a = u p P P6 ( p ) , which is also convex .
1'This assumption is made to emphasize the patterns of trade which are due to differences in property
rights between the two regions . This assumption can be relaxed or weakened to consider different
technologies and preferences across the regions, see Chichilnisky (1988a) .
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and optimal behaviour under a private property regime implies that
(9) F' = d/dx(F) = q/PE
from which the problem is reduced to analyzing a single first order differential
equation. To fix ideas, consider for example the case where
(10) F( z,x)=z a x b , 0 < a, b < I,
which implies that
(11) it = H(z,) - (PEb/q) biii-" z, a/(I - b)
The long run or steady state solution to this problem requires analyzing a single first
order differential equation
(12) H(z,) - (PEb/q)"-b) z, a/(I - b) = 0
To study the stability of the steady state solution we postulate that the adjustment
mechanism for the input x is that the quantity of the input applied to harvesting the
resource increases with profits as defined in (8) (see Dasgupta and Heal (1979),
p . 122 .) i .e .
(13) z, = fin, where p > 0 .
Figure 15.2
Typically (i .e . when a <I-b)) there will be two steady states, given by the inter-
section of the curves 11(t), a quadratic equation, and E(z) = (PE/qb)M"-b' z,a/(
The larger steady state (denoted z' in Figure 15 .2) is stable under (13) when the
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slope of E(z) nears zero, which we now assume . The solution path of the adjustment
process defined by (13) depends on its initial value ; the natural initial value is the
long run population size in its natural environment, i .e . the long-run stock without
economic encroachment, zo in Figure 15 .2 . In this event, the population size tends in
the long run to the steady state z' as illustrated in Figure 15 .2, where z' is a function
of PE and q, z' = z'( p E / q ) . The corresponding harvest or extraction is
E S = E'(PE/q)
Resource Supplies and Property Rights
The solution z' ( p E / q ) describes the long run behaviour of the stock of the
renewable resource E under private property regimes (equations 7 to 9) . Note
that E' = z'(PE/q ) is an increasing function of the relative market value of
the resource, pE . This is because a larger value PE leads to an upwards vertical
shift of the curve E (z) = (P E b / q ) °"' - b , z, a / ( I -b ) in Figure 15 .2 which
in turn implies a larger steady state harvest and a correspondingly smaller steady
state stock z' . For each q, let
(14)
Es = E'(PE),
denote the supply curve of the resource E in a stationary state as a function of the
price p E . E' ( p E ) is an increasing function PE as illustrated in Figure 15 .3 .
A PE
Figure 15.3
E'(PE)
ON- E
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Extinction of the Species in the Long Run
Figure 15.5
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Figure 15.6
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND NORTH-SOUTH TRADE
" E
Figure 15 .6 illustrates the private and social supply curves for the environmental
resource E. The social supply curve was obtained by equalizing the opportunity cost
q with the value of S m p i , q = p ES m P i . Instead, the private supply curve by
replacing (9) by
q = Pm P i p E . At each PE, more E is supplied under common property regimes.
I shall now use the results of Section 4 to study the behaviour of competitive and
unregulated markets, by analyzing the properties of the market equilibria of the
North-South model defined in Section 3 .
It was already observed that the South often specializes in the export of environ-
mentally intensive goods, such as timber, cash crops requiring forest clearing such
as palm oil and sugar, and other resource intensive commodities. In this section I
shall establish that the reason for this is that common property resources are over-
extracted in the South, because the true social costs of intensive environmental use
are not properly computed . This is also true in some measure in the North . However,
I shall argue that the divergence between private and social costs is larger in the
South than it is in the North. This divergence causes the South to specialize in the
export of environmentally intensive goods. The divergence between private and
social costs is, in turn, explained by the lack of property rights in common property
resources.
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Theorem 1 . Consider the North-South model where both regions have the same
technologies, the same homothetic preferences, and the same natural endowment of
environmental inputs, i .e . the same social supply curves . The model as defined in the
Appendix has at most one competitive equilibrium . If the South has ill-defined prop-
erry rights for the environmental input, e .g . the resource is common property, then at
a world equilibrium the two regions will trade, and the South will export environ-
mentally intensive goods . The South will exhibit private gains from trade (as defined
in Section 3) but in a steady state it extracts more environmental resources, and it
produces and exports more environmentally intensive goods (B) than is Pareto
efficient .
Proof. Recall our assumption that the two regions are identical, but the South's
supply of E is given by the private supply curve E"( pE ) while the North's is its
social supply E c ( pE ) . Consider the map from the world equilibrium commodity
prices PA* and PB* to equilibrium factor prices in each region r* and p E * 19 Under
these conditions, at the world equilibrium price vector p* w, factor prices will be the
same in the two regions, PE* and r* . However, since the supply curve of environ-
mental resources in the South, E "(p E ), was shown in Lemma I to be higher than
the supply curve E a ( pE * ) in the North, at the world's equilibrium price vector
p*  the South supplies more environmental resources than the North (Figure 15 .1) .
It follows that at p*w the South produces a larger amount of B than does the North,
since the production of B is intensive in the input E, which is more abundant in the
South (see also Chichilnisky, 1981, 1988a) .
Note that since the two regions have the same homothetic utilities, and at p* w the
two regions face the same relative prices for goods A and B, the North and the South
demand goods A and B in the same proportions . Therefore . at the equilibrium price
vector pw* both regions demand the same proportion of A and B, but the supply of B
in the South is proportionately larger. It follows that when the international markets
clear, the South must export B, and the North import B, i .e . the South is an exporter
of environmentally intensive goods at the world equilibrium . A computation of world
equilibrium prices in this model and a proof of their uniqueness, is in the Appendix .
Now consider a different world equilibrium (denoted by the equilibrium prices
pw**) where the South's supply of E is given by the social supply function
E ° ( p E * ) .2O By assumption this equilibrium is unique, and by the first welfare the-
orem, the equilibrium allocation is Pareto efficient. In particular the quantity of
environmental resources E used and the amount of B produced in the South is
Pareto efficient at the equilibrium p*E, with E * = E Q (p E * *) .
Now as shown above, in the world equilibrium (pw* ) where the South operates on
its private supply curve for E , E "( p E ) , the quantity of B produced by the South
exceeds the quantity supplied by the North (which equals the Pareto optimum B*) .
Similarly, the quantity of E extracted at this new equilibrium, E * = E "(p E * *)) ,
exceeds the . same quantity at the equilibrium pw**, which is E * = E O (p E *) .
°The existence of such a function is well known (Stolper and Samuelson (1941)) ; within this North-
South model it is established in Chichilnisky (1981 .1988a) for the case where the two regions have the
same constant returns to scale production functions without substitution. and it is also true for functions
with substitution such as Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale .
z 'When resource supplies in both regions are given by the social supply curves, the countries do no
trade in equilibrium, because they are identical in every way. This is an extreme specification which is
easily relaxed . In general . when both countries operate at their social supply curves for E. trade will take
place when either the technologies or the demand are different across the two regions .
NORTH-SOUTH TRADE 225
Therefore at p ,* the South uses more resources (E) and exports more environmen-
tally intensive goods (B) than is is Pareto efficient, as we wished to prove .
Note that the environmental overuse described in Theorem I is induced by a
competitive market response to the lack of property rights in tire South .
Corollary 1 . Ifexports of file environmentally intensive good B by the South lead
to the equalization ofthe price ofenvironmental resources used as inputs in the two
regions, the South will still use more environmental resources than the Not - tit (and
more than is Pareto optimal) unless property rights for the common property
resources are improved in rite South . If properry rights are not improved in file
South . then the exports of environmentally intensive goods and their domestic pro-
duction would have to be curtailed in order to achieve patterns of consumption
which duplicate rile North's social optimum .
This follows directly from Theorem I and Lemma I . The interest of this corol-
lary is to emphasize that the overuse of environmental resources by the South is not
necessarily caused by their prices being lower in the South than in the North, as it is
often thought . Equalizing prices through the international market does not resolve
the problem of overuse cf environmental resources .
6. PROPERTY RIGHTS POLICIES
Consider, for example, a policy which improves the land property rights of Amazo-
nian small farmers such as rubber-zappers . They will change the supply function of
Amazonian resources such as land, trees and biodiversity, and in turn affect relative
input prices . This in turn changes the computation of comparative advantages and
of gains from trade from agricultural exports based on deforestation of the Ama-
zon . Production patterns will shift . Export patterns will reflect more fully the social
cost of deforesting the Amazon. Examples of such property rights approach are
provided by recent agreements involving debt-for-nature swaps (Ruitenbeck,
1990), which changed property rights in the expectation that the changes will pro-
tect the rain forest . An interesting example is provided by recent agreements
between the U.S . pharmaceutical industry and Costa Rica among other countries .
The spearhead of this project is a pair of ingenious efforts to exploit the forests to
obtain medicinal products . The plans were described at a Symposium at Rock-
efeller University, January 1992, organized jointly by the Rain Forest Alliance, a
non-profit organization, and the New York Botanical Garden's Institute of Eco-
nomic Botany. 21 A Costa Rican research institute (INBIC) is prospecting for prom-
ising plants, microorganisms and insects to be screened for medical uses by Merck
and Company, the world's largest drug company. Merck & Co ., in turn, is support-
ing the prospecting effort financially and will share any resulting profits with Costa
Rica . The Costa Rican government, which has set aside 25% of its land as forest
preserves, will use the royalties and some of the initial payments to support the
conservation efforts . In another effort, a small Californian company, Shaman
Pharmaceuticals, is tapping the expertise of traditional healers - "shamans" or
medicine people - in various parts of the tropics . This company has already
' t See for example the report in Science Times, science supplement to the New York Times . 28 January
1992, page CI .
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its intended effects. Poverty and environmental abuse have a common root, and both
are the core of the North-South environmental dilemma.
8. APPENDIX
The North-South Model and Its Solutions
This Appendix provides a general equilibrium formulation of the North-South
model where one of the inputs of production in the South is a common property
resource . Factor endowments in the two countries are not fixed as in the Heckscher-
Ohlin model. but are variable, depending on factor prices . In this sense the model
follows Chichilnisky (1981, 1986) but here the factor supply curves have slopes
which depend on the property rights for the common property resource (as in Sec-
tion 4) while in Chichilnisky (1981, 1986) all factors are, instead. private goods. In
addition, Chichilnisky (1986) considers different technologies in the two regions,
while here the technologies and the preferences are identical in the two countries.
Except for the variable factor endowments, the model follows an Arrow-Debreu
formulation of two competitive economies trading with each other. A comparison of
the welfare properties of an equilibrium in the North-South model and the Arrow-
Debreu model can be found in Chichilnisky (1990) .
To simplify notation and computation we consider constant returns to scale pro-
duction functions and simple utilities. The model and its results are extendable to a
wide variety of utility functions and demand specifications and to Cobb-Douglas
and CES production functions, but at the cost of significantly longer computations .
For such extensions see Chichilnisky (1986) .
We specify first one economy: the South . It produces goods A and B using two
inputs : E and K. We consider a fixed proportions technology in each sector.
although there is substitution of factors at the aggregate level, as is shown below,
because endowments are variable, see Figure 15 .7 . Efficient production plans satisfy
B' = EB/a 1 = KB/c 1 . and As = EA/a, = KA/ c,, where the superscript s denotes sup-
ply. Recall that EA + EB = E' varies with prices and so does KA+ Kg= K' .
We assume that B is more resource intensive than A so that D = (arc_)-a,_cl) > 0.
Tile following equations define an equilibrium. Competitive behaviour on the part
of the firms assures zero profits :
(AI)PA = aIPE + cIr
(A2)P B = a,PE + c-)r
where PA and pB are the prices of A and B respectively, PE is the price of the
resource, and r is the rental on capital . As shown in Section 4, the environmental
resource Esupplied in equilibrium E' is an increasing function of PE for any given q .
To simplify the computation of solutions we assume here a simple form of this rela-
tion :
(A3) E' = a P E + E
where a >0 depends on the property rights regimes for E as established ill Section 4.
Lernma I : A large parameter a represents ill-defined property rights, such as the
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(A5)E S	 E d
(A6) K S = K d
As pe changes . so do factor prices r and PE (A I and A2) and therefore factor
endowments K' and E' vary .
For each set of factor endowments we have a different production possibility set .
As pa varies, therefore . we obtain the overall propuction possibility set shaded
above . This exhibits substitution in the use of the two factors : capital K and
environmental resources . E . The subsnution occurs through changes in the output
mix .
(A4) K' = o r + K °
Figure 15 .7
case of common property resources, and a small a represents better defined property
rights for the resource E. such as private property . The parameter a can vary as a
continuum, indicating a variety of "shades" of property rights between the two
extreme cases. Because of Lemma I we know that the slope of ES , a. increases with
the lack of internalization of externalities that each harvester produces on the others .
where a ? 0; everything that follows applies for p = 0 as well, i.e . when K' is a con-
stant. For a given property rights regime, factor supplies vary with factor prices, so
that the over-all production possibdirv frontier e.rltibits substitution in the total use of
capital and environmental resources, see Figure 15 .7 . In equilibrium all markets
clear:
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This is a quadratic equation in PB which has at most one positive root because the
constant term is negative . Therefore there is at most one equilibrium price pB* .
From PB* we can obtain in each country the equilibrium levels of all other variables :
PE* and r* from (A 1) and (A2) .
Es .
and
Ks.
from (A3~ and (A4),
Bs+
and
As*
from
the production functions, Xd from As .,
Ad .
and XB from (A11), so the (unique)
full equilibrium of the model is computed .
Note that in order to simplify computations, we have taken utility functions which
effectively make the demand for A in each region an exogenously chosen parameter
at an equilibrium . This follows Chichilnisky (1981, 1986), where it is also shown
that the results generalize to more general utilities and demand functions .
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